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Abortion Rights and Disability
Equality: A New Constitutional
Battleground
Allison M. Whelan* & Michele Goodwin**
Abstract
Abortion rights and access are under siege in the United
States. Even while current state-level attacks take on a newly
aggressive scale and scope—emboldened by the United States
Supreme Court’s June 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Organization to overturn Roe v. Wade and
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey—the legal landscape emerging in the wake of Dobbs is
decades in the making. In this Article, we analyze the pre- and
post-Roe landscapes, explaining that after the Supreme Court
recognized a right to abortion in Roe in 1973, anti-abortionists
sought to dismantle that right, first thread by thread and now
whole cloth. As we explain, these concerted efforts impose unique
and uniquely burdensome harms on those living at the
intersections of historically marginalized and vulnerable
identities, including persons of color, low-income populations,
persons with disabilities, and individuals in LGBTQ+
communities. This Article examines the deeply troubling—and
now successful—efforts to dismantle Roe and the legal attacks on
reproductive freedom. It foreshadows continuing legal efforts to
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gut abortion rights and new battlefronts related to disability
justice and LGBTQ+ equality emerging from the same efforts.
Focusing on persons with disabilities, this Article argues that the
political movement to deny abortion rights will eviscerate gains
made toward disability justice, as well as many other social
justice gains such as LGBTQ+ equality.
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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of contemporary threats to reproductive
freedom, advocacy organizations are turning to social movement
frameworks long articulated and adopted by Black women. For
centuries, Black women urged a more nuanced and capacious
understanding of discrimination that accounts for the unique
ways in which racism, sexism, disability, and ageism produce
unequal and immoral treatments under and guided by law.1 In

1. See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM
(1981); Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95
B.U. L. REV. 713, 719 (2015) (noting that Pauli Murray anticipated Kimberlé
Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality); Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood,
Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L.
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her iconic nineteenth century memoir, Harriet Jacobs prevailed
upon readers to understand the unique ways in which racial
subordination and sexual violence toxically combined to
threaten the safety of even young Black girls from the sexual
predations of white families that held Black children in
bondage.2
Poignantly, Jacobs illumed a world in which three
generations of Black women suffered under the vile conditions
of enslavement shaped by overlapping and distinct horrors, and
framed by their differences in age, disability, and other
vulnerabilities.3 Most importantly, the memoir illustrated
conditions universally experienced by Black women, highlighted
as well by Sojourner Truth,4 Harriet Tubman,5 Frederick
Douglass,6 and W.E.B. Du Bois.7
REV. 232, 243 (1965) (“[I]t is exceedingly difficult to determine whether a Negro
woman is being discriminated against because of race or sex.”); Jennifer C.
Nash, ‘Home Truths’ on Intersectionality, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 445, 450
(2011) (describing how Sojourner Truth, Ida B. Wells, and Anna Julia Cooper
“labored to show how race and gender cooperate to marginalize black women”);
Pauli Murray, Memorandum in Support of Retaining the Amendment to H.R.
7152, Title VII (Equal Opportunity) to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment
Because of Sex (Apr. 14, 1964) (on file with Schlesinger Libr., Radcliff Inst. for
Advanced Stud., Harv. Univ.) (“[Sex and race] discrimination are so closely
entertwined [sic] and so similar that Negro women are uniquely qualified to
affirm their interrelatedness.”).
2. See generally HARRIET JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL.
WRITTEN BY HERSELF (Maria L. Child ed. 1861).
3. See generally id.
4. See Compare the Two Speeches, THE SOJOURNER TRUTH PROJECT,
https://perma.cc/MKX4-FEX7.
5. See BENJAMIN DREW, A NORTH-SIDE VIEW OF SLAVERY: THE REFUGEE
OR THE NARRATIVES OF FUGITIVE SLAVES IN CANADA RELATED BY THEMSELVES
WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE HISTORY AND CONDITION OF THE COLORED POPULATION
OF UPPER CANADA 30 (1856) (“I had two sisters carried away in a
chain-gang,—one of them left two children . . . I think slavery is the next thing
to hell.” (quoting Harriet Tubman)).
6. See FREDERICK DOUGLASS, WHAT TO THE SLAVE, IS THE FOURTH OF
JULY? (1852) (“The crack you heard, was the sound of the slave-whip; the
scream you heard, was from the woman you saw with the babe. Her speed had
faltered under the weight of her child and her chains! That gash on her
shoulder tells her to move on.”); see also PHILIP S. FONER, FREDERICK
DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 188–206 (1999).
7. See W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860–1880,
11 (1935) (describing slavery as the “deliberate commercial breeding and sale
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Building on this robust literary and historical legacy, in the
late twentieth century, Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw urged a
deeper and more meaningful understanding of the unique
harms experienced by Black women at the intersections of race
and sex. From this, the important term “intersectionality” was
introduced in 1989 to describe how race and sex intersect to
shape the experiences of Black women.8 Increasingly, scholars
understand the value and importance of this framework and
how its application extends well beyond race and sex,
fundamentally reshaping how scholars think about some of
society’s most pressing social and legal concerns.
That is, intersectionality “expose[s] how single-axis
thinking undermines legal thinking, disciplinary knowledge
production, and struggles for social justice.”9 Critically, the
framework “helps explain the realities of people who have
multiple identities in which they experience oppression, and
how they not only contend with the harms of each of those
separate identities . . . but also experience compounded and
unique harms at the particular intersections of those
identities.”10
This Article builds from that important conceptual
framework grounded in centuries of thought on Black women’s
status in society to examine the deeply troubling—and now
successful—efforts to dismantle Roe v. Wade11 and legal attacks
on reproductive freedom. It foreshadows continuing legal efforts
to gut abortion rights and new battlefronts related to disability
justice and LGBTQ+12 equality emerging from the same
of human labor for profit”); see also W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK
FOLKS 5, 135 (W.W. NORTON & CO. 1999) (1903).
8. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 141–50 (1989).
9. Sumi Cho et al., Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory,
Applications, and Praxis, 38 SIGNS 785, 787 (2013).
10. NIKITA MHATRE, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, AUTISTIC SELF
ADVOC. NETWORK, ACCESS, AUTONOMY, AND DIGNITY: ABORTION CARE FOR
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 3 (2021), https://perma.cc/P2AA-K698 (PDF).
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
12. This Article’s use of the acronym “LGBTQ+” should be read broadly.
“LGBTQ+” includes but is not limited to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
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efforts.13 It argues that the political tides to deny abortion rights
will eviscerate gains made toward disability justice.14 As we
argue, reproductive rights, the policing of reproductive bodies
and identities, bodily autonomy, and freedom of “choice” cannot
be fully understood without appreciating peoples’ lived
experiences and the spectrum of subordination that redounds on
the lives of vulnerable people. As such, the “choice” framework
proves hollow and unsatisfactory to meet the challenges and
demands of the current legal landscape. For this reason, we
adopt and advocate for a reproductive justice lens.15
We make several key observations. First, despite the
promise that Roe held for reproductive freedom, the choice
framework set forth by Roe operated in a more illusory than real
manner for many pregnant persons,16 such as persons with
physical disabilities, who are the focus of this Article.17 In other
words, Roe was never a “north star” for reproductive freedom,
but rather an important and landmark decision to dismantle
criminal laws targeting physicians that assisted patients in the
termination of pregnancies. Sadly, Roe could not withstand nor
stem the tide of Hyde-era amendments and legislation to
distance poor persons from the promise of reproductive

and queer people, including nonbinary, gender-nonconforming, genderqueer,
and questioning individuals.
13. See infra Part I. This Article concentrates on disability justice, while
subsequent work will focus on LGBTQ+ equality.
14. See infra Part III.
15. Reproductive justice, which builds from intersectionality and
recognizes reproductive rights as human rights, represents a pivotal issue of
the twenty-first century. See International Conference on Population and
Development, Programme of Action, ¶¶ 7.1–7.26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13
(Sept. 13, 1994) (“Reproductive rights embrace certain human rights,
[including the] right to make decisions concerning reproduction free of
discrimination, coercion and violence.”). See generally U.N. POPULATION FUND
ET AL., REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK FOR NATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (2014), https://perma.cc/86H5-RD2P.
16. Abortion is often framed as a “women’s” issue, but transgender,
nonbinary, and gender-nonconforming people may also become pregnant and
need abortions. Whenever possible, this Article uses gender-neutral language.
The term “woman” or “women” may be used, particularly where the sources
use that terminology.
17. See generally Dorothy Roberts, Reproductive Justice, Not Just Rights,
DISSENT MAG., Fall 2015, https://perma.cc/G63E-6QSV.
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freedom.18 Nor did advocates of the choice framework expand
their vision to include economically disadvantaged persons too
poor to access reproductive health services, including abortion.
Second, we note that state and federal regulation of
reproduction can inhibit, or even eliminate, the ability of many
women, girls, or persons with the capacity for pregnancy to
exercise choice. This is glaring and apparent in the
contemporary landscape and milieu, but such conditions
preexisted the most recent battles illustrated by Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Organization.19 Third, a person’s
ability to exercise choice is further informed and influenced by
their race, class, disability status, and/or sexual orientation. For
example, a century ago, eugenics and political platforms related
to procreative “fitness” influenced and shaped state legislation
and ultimately Supreme Court jurisprudence.20
Our contribution to this valuable Symposium21 emerges at
a time of a chilling legal storm. Despite earlier warnings, the
dismantling of abortion rights with a proliferation of
anti-abortion laws at the state level can no longer be ignored or
pushed aside.22 The Supreme Court’s decision to hear Dobbs,
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson,23 and United States v.
Texas24 during the Court’s 2021 term raised fears amongst
advocates for reproductive rights, health, and justice that the
Court would overturn Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.25 These fears now materialize with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dobbs to overturn Roe and Casey.

18. See infra notes 120–122 and accompanying text.
19. 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022); see infra notes 23–28 and accompanying text.
20. See generally, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding a
Virginia law authorizing the Commonwealth’s right to forcibly sterilize a
person deemed unfit to procreate).
21. This paper was presented at the invitation of the W&L Law Review
at the 2021–2022 Lara D. Gass Symposium at Washington and Lee University
School of Law.
22. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws: Moral Panic and
the New Constitutional Battlefront, 102 CAL. L. REV. 781, 781 (2014).
23. 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021).
24. 142 S. Ct. 416 (2021) (mem.).
25. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
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The laws at issue in these cases were some of the most
restrictive in the nation at that time. The Mississippi law
considered in Dobbs bans abortions at fifteen weeks’ gestation
and contains no exception for rape or incest26—exceptions that
were once a rare source of agreement.27 The Texas law, Senate
Bill 8 (“SB 8”), goes much further, banning abortions upon
detection of a fetal heartbeat, typically around six weeks’
gestation, when many do not yet know they are pregnant.28 Like
the Mississippi law, it contains no exceptions for rape or incest.29
Unlike most other state abortion laws, which are enforced by
state officials, SB 8 provides a civil cause of action against those
who aid and abet an individual seeking to terminate a
pregnancy after six weeks, awarding plaintiffs at least $10,000
for each successful judgment.30 Essentially, the law deputizes
ordinary citizens as “bounty hunters,” legalizing a form of
vigilantism and harassment of patients, doctors, nurses, and
anyone else providing aid and support to a pregnant person
considering an abortion.31 Notably, it pulls from the archives of
American slavery, where such laws made “fugitives” of
individuals who sought bodily autonomy and freedom.32 In
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, the Supreme Court ruled
that the lawsuit brought by Texas abortion providers against a
group of state medical licensing officials could proceed, and
returned the case to the conservative U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.33 The Fifth Circuit then sent the case to the
26. MISS. CODE § 41-41-191 (2018).
27. Michele Goodwin & Mary Ziegler, Whatever Happened to the
Exceptions for Rape and Incest?, THE ATL. (Nov. 29, 2021),
https://perma.cc/S5X5-GRT8.
28. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.204 (2021).
29. See generally id. §§ 171.001–171.212.
30. Id.
31. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Robert L. Tsai &
Mary Ziegler, The New Abortion Vigilantism, N.Y. REV. (Sept. 23, 2021),
https://perma.cc/UTC5-2Z88 (PDF).
32. See, e.g., Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462; Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302.
33. Whole Woman’s Health, 142 S. Ct. at 539. The Court ruled that the
abortion providers could not proceed against state court judges, clerks, the
state attorney general, and an anti-abortion activist whom the providers
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Texas Supreme Court for further interpretation.34 On March 11,
2022, the Texas Supreme Court effectively dealt the final blow
to the legal challenges against the law, ruling that medical
licensing officials did not have any power to enforce the law and
thus could not be sued.35 The law remains in effect as of this
writing. And now, post-Roe, numerous states have enacted
abortion bans, many of which are subject to ongoing legal
challenges.36
Unsurprisingly, other states quickly proposed copycat bills
to SB 8, sometimes exceeding the level of civil liberty and civil
rights infringements found in the Texas law.37 In Ohio, for
example, a bill with a citizen enforcement provision was
introduced that would ban all abortions, at any time, except to
prevent the death of the pregnant person.38 On March 14, 2022,
Idaho became the first state to pass abortion legislation modeled
after SB 8.39
believed would be likely to sue them under SB 8. See generally id. The Court
also issued a brief, unsigned order dismissing the Biden Administration’s
challenge to the Texas law as “improvidently granted,” a decision that does not
resolve the case on the merits. United States v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021)
(mem.).
34. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 23 F.4th 380, 389 (5th Cir. 2022).
35. See Kate Zernike & Adam Liptak, Texas Supreme Court Shuts Down
Final Challenge to Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2022),
https://perma.cc/4D5Q-M9GK.
36. See Tracking the States Where Abortion Is Now Banned, N.Y. TIMES,
https://perma.cc/GZS6-L9YG (last updated Sept. 9, 2022, 8:15 AM) (providing
maps and a chart which are updated periodically and describe the current
status of abortion laws in the states); see also Tierney Sneed & Veronica
Stracqualursi, Abortion Is Banned or Severely Limited in a Number of States.
Here’s Where Things Stand, CNN, https://perma.cc/ZMN9-EPXB (last updated
Sept. 8, 2022, 4:00 PM). On August 5, 2022, the Governor of Indiana signed
the first post-Roe abortion ban. Mitch Smith & Julie Bosman, Indiana
Governor Signs First Post-Roe Abortion Ban, With Limited Exceptions, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 5, 2022), https://perma.cc/R2M6-QE8V.
37. See, e.g., Katie Kindelan, Abortion Bill Similar to Texas’ Controversial
(Sept.
23,
2021),
Ban
Introduced
in
Florida,
ABC NEWS
https://perma.cc/JMM2-LB6U; Oklahoma Senate Approves Texas-Style
Anti-Abortion Law Allowing Private Lawsuits, NBCDFW (Mar. 11, 2022),
https://perma.cc/BU5Q-4X6Y.
38. H.B. 480, 134th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2021) (codified in
scattered sections of OHIO REV. CODE ch. 2919).
39. IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8801 to 18-8808 (2022). Like SB 8, the law bans
abortions once a fetal heartbeat is detected. Id. It provides a civil cause of

ABORTION RIGHTS AND DISABILITY EQUALITY

973

Despite Roe, Casey, and the now-defunct guarantees of the
Court’s decisions in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt40 and
June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo,41 which struck down
abortion restrictions in Texas and Louisiana, respectively,
states continued to erect significant barriers to reproductive
autonomy. Advocates for these increasingly broad and severe
restrictions gambled on the premise that sufficient votes existed
on the Supreme Court to overturn Roe or otherwise significantly
curtail the right to abortion.42 Given the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dobbs, those gambles were worth it for opponents of
abortion.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I situates the
current debate on abortion rights, clarifying their status in the
wake of Dobbs.43 It then addresses current legal challenges and
hurdles to abortion rights and access at the state and federal
levels, making clear that those interested in advancing
reproductive justice must mobilize and campaign for
reproductive rights rather than wait for legislatures to initiate
legal change.44 Part II unpacks the intersectionality of these
issues by exploring the impact of these laws on persons with

action against any medical professional who “knowingly or recklessly
attempted, performed, or induced the abortion in violation of” the law to the
person on whom an abortion is performed or attempted to be performed, as
well as the father, grandparent, sibling, aunt, or uncle of the “preborn child.”
Id. § 18-8807(1)(a). Unlike SB 8, the law includes exceptions for “medical
emergencies” as well as rape and incest. Id. § 18-8804(1). On April 12, 2022,
Oklahoma Governor Keven Stitt signed a bill into law that makes it a felony
to perform an abortion at any time during pregnancy, except to save the life of
the pregnant person. Sean Murphy, Oklahoma Governor Signs Bill to Make
Abortion Illegal, AP (Apr. 12, 2022), https://perma.cc/D67R-CVBV. This law
does not, however, contain a civil enforcement mechanism like SB 8. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 63, § 1-731.3 (2022).
40. 579 U.S. 582 (2016), abrogated by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
41. 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020), abrogated by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s
Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
42. See Amy Howe, Majority of Court Appears Poised to Roll Back
Abortion Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/EGJ5-JTHP;
Mary Ziegler, The End of Roe Is Coming, and It Is Coming Soon, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/9SB7-XY3N.
43. See infra Part I.
44. See infra Part I.
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physical disabilities.45 Part III offers a normative account,
arguing that communities at the intersections must embrace
their commonalities and differences, and come together to build
intersectional coalitions to further the reproductive justice
discourse and to advance common goals of bodily autonomy,
self-determination, and equality.46
I.

ABORTION RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

In Part I, we situate the debate over abortion rights in the
United States by providing a brief overview of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence in Roe, Casey, and Dobbs. While the
general concepts undergirding Roe and Casey may be perceived
as well understood, professors and pundits in both law school
and popular discourse misread and misrepresent the core
holdings in these cases. As to the former, law professors
frequently teach that Roe established reproductive rights for
women. While not inaccurate, a more nuanced reading
illuminates the Court striking down criminal laws that banned
physicians from performing abortions rather than recognizing
women’s abilities to govern their own bodies without consulting
medical providers. A more rigorous reading of Roe avoids this
faulty intellectual shortcut and reveals other important
holdings in Roe, such as rejecting fetal personhood and
recognizing reproductive freedom as a fundamental right.
Equally, the abridged reading of Casey ignores the important
acknowledgment that domestic violence impedes and threatens
reproductive freedom.47 Further, laws that establish rights in
third parties vis-à-vis a woman’s pregnancy undermine
reproductive freedom and cannot stand.
We first offer a clearer reading of Roe and Casey and then
clarify the current status of abortion rights in the United States
in light of Dobbs, addressing present challenges at the state and
federal levels.

45. See infra Part II.
46. See infra Part III.
47. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98
(1992).
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Jurisprudential Foundations: Roe and Casey

The Supreme Court decided the landmark abortion case Roe
v. Wade in 1973, striking down several Texas laws that
criminalized abortion except when necessary to save the life of
the mother.48 The Court invalidated these laws on the ground
that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the decision
to obtain an abortion, although that right is not unqualified.49
Roe established a three-part framework in which a woman’s
right to abortion and the state’s right to protect potential life
shift. According to Justice Blackmun, the author of the Court’s
decision, a woman’s right to abortion is strongest during the first
trimester, when the state may not regulate abortion and the
decision is left to the woman and her healthcare provider.50
During the second trimester, the state may promote its interest
in the woman’s health by regulating abortion in ways that
reasonably relate to preserving and protecting maternal
health.51 Post-viability, the state may promote its interest in
potential human life by regulating or even proscribing abortion
except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother.52
In Casey, the Court reaffirmed Roe but abandoned the
trimester framework and the strict scrutiny standard, replacing
it with a more permissive “undue burden” standard.53
Restrictions that placed an undue burden on a person seeking
an abortion were unconstitutional.54 Under Casey, a state
regulation imposed an undue burden when it “has the purpose
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”55 Viewed through the
lens of reproductive freedom, both cases were imperfect even if
important to the liberation of women’s abilities to govern their
pregnancies.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 152–55.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id. at 163–64.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
Id. at 877.
Id.
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In Roe, the Court determined that abortion was a woman’s
choice in consultation with her doctor.56 In other words, even in
the early 1970s, the Court stopped short of ruling that women
possessed the basic moral and intellectual capacities to
independently govern their bodies when it relates to pregnancy.
Further, even while the decision established a right associated
with abortion, it liberated male doctors in the performance of
the procedure. At that time in American medicine, doctors were
overwhelmingly
male,
including
obstetricians
and
gynecologists.57 Thus, as much as Roe served the interests of
women, it also liberated male doctors to expand their practices
without threat of state surveillance, hostility, and arrests.
Therefore, doctors could not be charged with assault or even
murder in the termination of a pregnancy and the death of a
fetus.
By contrast, twenty years later in Casey, the Court centered
its decision on women rather than their physicians. Notably, not
only had women’s rights taken deeper root within American law
and jurisprudence, but Justice Sandra Day O’Connor had
integrated the Court the decade prior.58 In the twenty-year gap
between Roe and Casey, myriad sex-discriminatory laws that
constrained women’s ability to live equal lives to men fell away,
expanding opportunities in education, employment, and civil life
that were previously foreclosed to women. Importantly,
fastening the abortion right to women rather than women in
consultation with their physicians was more than symbolic, it
was a substantive and overdue recognition of the legal and
moral capacities of women to independently govern their
reproductive health. Even so, a sharper reading of Casey also
sets the stage for more clearly understanding that the genesis of
targeted regulations of abortion providers (TRAP) laws began

56. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 167.
57. See Phillip R. Kletke et al., The Growing Proportion of Female
Physicians: Implications for the US Physician Supply, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
300, 301 (1990) (reporting that in 1970, only 7.1% of active physicians in the
United States were female); Physician Statistics Summary (1970–1999),
PINNACLE HEALTH GRP. (Dec. 31, 1999), https://perma.cc/N79X-DRXM.
58. See Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Sandra Day O’Connor: A
Justice Who Has Made a Difference in Constitutional Law, 32 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 915, 917 (2001).
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with Casey, albeit likely not predicted by the Justices at the
time. That is, while the Court shifted states’ attention away
from women consulting with their physicians to terminate a
pregnancy, it did not abandon its historic patterns of
paternalism in association with women’s liberty interests.
In Casey, the Court reasoned that states could enact laws
that furthered their interest in determining that women were
fully informed in their decision-making to terminate a
pregnancy.59 As such, states could impose waiting periods and
other constraints that would not obstruct the right to terminate
a pregnancy (that is, not impose an “undue burden”), but rather
which would ensure informed consent.60 Thirty years later, such
provisions would serve as a blueprint for dismantling Roe and
undermining Casey. For decades, Roe and Casey provided the
foundation for the Supreme Court’s extensive abortion
jurisprudence, including myriad cases addressing federal and
state abortion laws and regulations, along with other cases
addressing broader reproductive rights such as access to
contraception.
B.

Ongoing Legal Challenges to Abortion Rights at the State
and Federal Levels

Despite Roe, Casey, and other Supreme Court decisions
reaffirming the right to an abortion, state and federal laws and
regulations frequently infringed on this right. It was well
understood that the Court’s current 6-3 conservative majority
placed abortion rights at great risk. Indeed, on one hand, the
Court gutted almost fifty years of precedent when it overturned
Roe and Casey in Dobbs. On the other hand, if one considers the
too frequently overlooked Supreme Court jurisprudence in
Skinner v. Oklahoma,61 which articulated a human and civil
right to individual reproductive decision-making, the Court
eviscerated eighty years of stare decisis in its Dobbs decision.62
This Part examines common restrictions at the state and federal

59.
60.
61.
62.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
Id.
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
See id. at 562–63.
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levels, providing a descriptive account of the ongoing legal
challenges and hurdles to abortion rights in the United States.
1.

State Restrictions

Today, states are the primary abortion battleground in the
United States.63 Emboldened by the Supreme Court’s
strengthening conservative majority, 2021 marked the first time
that states enacted more than one hundred abortion restrictions
in a single year.64 Notably, however, the fierce push to curtail
abortion rights began a decade prior, if not before. Between 2011
and 2013, more abortion restrictions were enacted than the
previous decade combined.65 That period marked a backlash
against the Obama Administration and the Affordable Care Act,
which furthered contraceptive access; the mainstreaming of
evangelism and its influence in politics; and the rise of tensions
within the Republican Party.66 Ultimately, a movement
transpired that more clearly aligned with anti-abortion
sentiment than ever before, particularly considering that five of
the seven Roe Justices who voted to strike down laws
criminalizing abortion were appointed by Republican
Presidents.67
63. See generally ELIZABETH NASH, GUTTMACHER INST., THE DANGER
AHEAD: EARLY INDICATORS SHOW STATES WILL BE THE MAIN ABORTION
BATTLEGROUND IN 2021 (2021), https://perma.cc/9Y6J-GTD2.
64. ELIZABETH NASH, GUTTMACHER INST., FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER, U.S.
STATES ENACTED MORE THAN 100 ABORTION RESTRICTIONS IN A SINGLE YEAR
(2021), https://perma.cc/GN23-D23T. As of April 8, 2022, at least sixteen states
had “attempted to ban abortion before viability but were stopped by court
order.” GUTTMACHER INST., STATE BANS ON ABORTION THROUGHOUT PREGNANCY
(2022), https://perma.cc/A42F-NW42. Of these, three attempted to ban
abortion throughout pregnancy and eight attempted to ban abortion around
six weeks based on the presence of fetal heartbeat. Id.
65. According to the Guttmacher Institute, states passed 205 abortion
restrictions from 2011 to 2013, compared to 189 from 2001 to 2010. Heather
D. Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Puts
Providers—and the Women They Serve—in the Crosshairs, 17 GUTTMACHER
POL’Y REV. 9, 10 (2014).
66. See Jillian Weinberger, How We Got Here: Roe v. Wade From 1973 to
Today, VOX (May 6, 2022), https://perma.cc/CE6V-BHHW.
67. See id. (“The anti-abortion movement has also focused on building a
pipeline of judicial nominees through organizations like the Federalist
Society.”).
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Increasingly, states designed laws to challenge Roe and the
constitutional right to abortion directly, such as through
“trigger laws,” which were designed to take effect automatically
or through quick state action if the Supreme Court overturned
Roe—as it has now done in Dobbs.68 States also enacted—and
continue to enact—laws that slowly chip away at abortion rights
or make abortion more difficult to access.69 These include TRAP
laws, mandatory counseling and waiting periods, restrictions on
medication abortion, and insurance restrictions.70
TRAP laws represent an important part of the anti-abortion
movement. By design, the laws shut down abortion providers by
imposing costly and burdensome regulations, such as facility
requirements and hospital relationship/admitting privilege
requirements.71 Proponents of TRAP laws suggest that these
laws protect and promote a pregnant person’s health while still
retaining their ability to “choose” an abortion.72 In reality, these
laws manifest little connection to safety and greatly inhibit the
ability to exercise choice, particularly for persons whose
identities include intersections of race, sex, disability, or
LGBTQ+ statuses.73 The American Medical Association (AMA),
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG), and other medical groups oppose these laws because
they have the opposite effect by blocking access to safe
abortions.74 Further, when these laws result in clinic closures,
68. See GUTTMACHER INST., ABORTION POLICY IN THE ABSENCE OF ROE
(2022), https://perma.cc/9CWN-KCBA (“[Thirteen] states have post-Roe laws
to ban all or nearly all abortions that would be triggered if Roe were
overturned.”).
69. See Weinberger, supra note 66.
70. See Types of State Attacks on Abortion, PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
https://perma.cc/N3X8-ZY5P.
71. See
What
Are
TRAP
Laws?,
PLANNED
PARENTHOOD,
https://perma.cc/P8ST-RSZD.
72. For example, Marjorie Dannenfelser of the Susan B. Anthony List, an
anti-abortion group, described the Supreme Court’s decision in Hellerstedt,
which struck down TRAP laws, as “anti-woman” and “anti-health-of-women.”
Reaction to Supreme Court Ruling Striking Down Abortion Restrictions in
Texas, NPR (June 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/JRF7-F8RH.
73. See infra Part II.
74. See, e.g., Brief of American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 21–25, June Med. Servs.
L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (No. 18-1323); Am. Coll. of Obstetricians
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they inhibit access to essential non-abortion healthcare services,
such as contraception, cancer screenings, prenatal care,
gender-affirming care, and more.75
For example, the Supreme Court struck down two TRAP
laws in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and June Medical
Services L.L.C. v. Russo. In Hellerstedt, the Court reaffirmed
Casey and struck down two Texas TRAP laws.76 One required
abortion providers to obtain admitting privileges at local
hospitals located within thirty miles of their clinic.77 The other
contained surgical facility standards and required abortion
facilities to satisfy minimum safety standards applicable to
ambulatory surgical centers, such as those relating to the size of
the nursing staff, building dimensions, and other building
requirements.78 The Court struck down both, explaining that
neither actually promoted patient health and safety but rather
imposed an undue burden on a woman’s right to seek a
pre-viability abortion.79 The Court reached its conclusion by
assessing whether the laws’ benefits outweighed their burdens
to determine whether they imposed an undue burden.80
Four years later in June Medical, the Court struck down a
similar Louisiana admitting privileges requirement.81 Four
Justices voted to uphold Hellerstedt and the undue burden
standard.82 Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment,

& Gynecologists, Comm. on Health Care for Underserved Women, ACOG
Committee Opinion No. 815: Increasing Access to Abortion, 136 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY e107 (2020).
75. See, e.g., PLANNED PARENTHOOD, PLANNED PARENTHOOD 2019–2020
ANNUAL REPORT 35 (2020), https://perma.cc/8XAQ-AJSB (PDF); Kate Sosin,
Advocates Fear Texas Abortion Ban Could Impact LGBTQ+ Health Care, THE
19TH (Sept. 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/5PGY-H5MC (listing hormone
replacement therapy, surgery referrals, puberty blockers for teens, and testing
and treatment for HIV and STDs as other services provided by Planned
Parenthood).
76. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582, 591 (2016).
77. Id. at 610.
78. Id. at 590, 615.
79. Id. at 590.
80. See id. at 608–23.
81. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2113 (2020).
82. Id. at 2112.
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but would have struck down the law under stare decisis.83 He
voiced disagreement with the undue burden standard used by
the plurality.84 Many commentators overlooked the fact that the
Chief Justice would have dispensed with the rigorous empirical
analysis started in Casey and continued most assertively in
Whole Woman’s Health. Instead of balancing benefits against
burdens, Chief Justice Roberts would have considered first
whether an abortion restriction has a legitimate purpose and is
reasonably related to that purpose.85 Given the Court’s current
makeup, these two decisions almost certainly would be decided
differently today.86
As described earlier, the legacy of Casey includes upholding
Roe, yet it also set the stage for mandatory counseling and
post-counseling waiting periods, ranging from eighteen to
seventy-two hours, which make accessing abortion needlessly
difficult.87 States claim these requirements are necessary to
ensure patients make informed choices.88 In Casey, the Supreme
Court held that Pennsylvania’s twenty-four-hour waiting period
did not impose an undue burden on the right to an abortion.89
The counseling requirements, however, are duplicative and not
medically necessary, as every state already requires that
patients provide informed consent prior to receiving medical
treatment.90 Even worse, the laws often mandate the provision

83. Although concurring with the judgment in this case, Chief Justice
Roberts, who dissented in Hellerstedt, revoiced his opinion that he “continue[d]
to believe that [Hellerstedt] was wrongly decided.” Id. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2138–39.
86. See Michael Scherer et al., A 49-Year Crusade: Inside the Movement
to Overturn Roe v. Wade, WASH. POST. (May 7, 2022), https://perma.cc/T8JGGG69.
87. See Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST.
(Aug. 1, 2022), https://perma.cc/HXU5-UPDM.
88. Id.
89. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
90. Generally, informed consent requires that (i) the patient has the
capacity/competence to make decisions about their care, (ii) the patient’s
decision is voluntary, and (iii) the patient is provided sufficient, accurate
information, such as benefits, risks, costs, and alternatives. Informed Consent,
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of irrelevant, misleading, or scientifically unsupported
information.91 Mandatory waiting periods are particularly
problematic when the initial counseling must be done in person,
thus requiring patients to make two potentially lengthy trips to
obtain an abortion.92
As further discussed in Part II, multiple trips impose
significant, sometimes prohibitive burdens for certain patient
populations, such as persons with low incomes or travel-limiting
disabilities and those who live in “abortion deserts,” residing at
least one hundred miles away from the nearest abortion
facility.93 As with many state abortion restrictions, evidence
suggests that mandatory waiting periods are unnecessary,
generally do not influence a patient’s decision, and can harm a
patient’s physical and mental health.94 Nevertheless, states

Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://perma.cc/DTX6DMFV.
91. See generally Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra
note 87. Texas, for example, requires patients to be informed of a possible link
between abortion and breast cancer. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 171.012(a)(1)(B)(iii). Other states require similar disclosures. See, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(a)(3); MISS. CODE ANN. 41-41-33(1)(a)(ii). ACOG, the
American Cancer Society, and other medical associations have all stated that
the best available evidence shows no causal link between abortion and breast
cancer. See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON
GYNECOLOGIC PRACTICE, ACOG COMM. OPINION NO. 434: INDUCED ABORTION
AND BREAST CANCER RISK 1 (2009), https://perma.cc/5ZXQ-93R8 (PDF)
(reaffirmed 2019) (“Early studies of the relationship between prior induced
abortion and breast cancer risk were methodologically flawed.”).
92. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 87.
93. See Sarah Fowler, Can Mississippi’s Last Abortion Clinic Survive?,
POLITICO (May 26, 2021), https://perma.cc/B8ML-ASLP; Elizabeth Nash et al.,
Impact of Texas’ Abortion Ban: A 14-Fold Increase in Driving Distance to Get
an Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug. 4, 2021), https://perma.cc/VG6V-R47G
(last updated Sept. 15, 2021) (noting that after SB 8 went into effect, pregnant
persons in Texas had to travel an average of 247 miles one way to get to the
nearest abortion provider); Claudia Stagoff-Belfort, Abortion Deserts:
Inequitable Access Amidst COVID-19, (Jan. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/S7DAMUEN (noting that at the time of the article’s publication in January 2021, at
least six states—including North Dakota, Missouri, Mississippi, Kentucky,
and West Virginia—had only one abortion facility, meaning that many
residents in the South and Midwest live in “abortion deserts”).
94. See GUTTMACHER INST., WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION (2020),
https://perma.cc/BF46-EVKX; see also infra Part II.
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continue to impose such requirements.95 The imposition of extra
and unnecessary requirements for abortion illustrate abortion
exceptionalism, which refers to the tendency of courts and
legislatures to subject abortion to unique and unduly
burdensome rules.96
States increasingly impose restrictions on medication
abortion that extend beyond the requirements for the drugs
imposed by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).97
Specifically, as of August 2022, twenty-nine states require
clinicians who administer medication abortion to be
physicians;98 two states prohibit the use of medication abortion
starting at a specific point in pregnancy, with one banning it
earlier than the FDA-approved indication of ten weeks’
gestation;99 and nineteen states require the clinician providing
a medication abortion to be physically present when the
medication is administered, thereby prohibiting the use of
95. See Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 87.
96. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue
Burden Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1047, 1048 n.2 (2014). Mandatory
waiting periods, which are almost never required for other medical procedures,
provide another example of abortion exceptionalism. Id. One other medical
service requiring mandatory waiting periods, also in reproductive healthcare,
is Medicaid-funded sterilization procedures. 42 C.F.R. § 50.203. Individuals
generally must give informed consent 30 days prior to the procedure. Id. This
policy was enacted in response to coercive sterilization practices—particularly
on women of color and those with mental illnesses—and aims to achieve a
delicate balance between recognizing this deeply troubling history on the one
hand and over-paternalistic policies that impede access to sterilization on the
other. See Sonya Borrero et al., Medicaid Policy on Sterilization—
Anachronistic or Still Relevant?, 370 N. ENGL. J. MED. 102, 102 (2014).
Physician-assisted suicide also generally requires a waiting period. See, e.g.,
ORE. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.850(1) (2021) (requiring a fifteen-day waiting
period between initial oral request and writing of a prescription and
forty-eight hours between written request and writing of prescription); WASH.
REV. CODE § 70.245.110 (2008) (same).
97. See infra notes 128–135 and accompanying text.
98. Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug. 1, 2022),
https://perma.cc/W668-WYAS.
99. An Oklahoma law prohibited medication abortion after forty-nine
days’ gestation, but that law was permanently enjoined by court order. See
Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Just. v. Cline, 441 P.3d 1145, 1156 (Okla. 2019) (noting
that the forty-nine day gestational period unduly burdened women seeking
abortions because there was “much less time to discover the pregnancy, and to
decide whether to terminate it”).
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telemedicine to prescribe medication abortions.100 Moreover, in
states implementing or considering abortion bans after Dobbs,
these bans encompass both medical and surgical abortions.
These laws are uniquely harmful for persons for whom travel is
impossible or burdensome, whether due to economic constraints,
geographic location, physical disability, or other constraints.101

100. Medication Abortion, supra note 98. For example, Texas SB 4
prohibits use of medication abortion after forty-nine days’ gestation (lower
than the FDA-approved seventy days’ gestation), requires that a physician
physically examine the pregnant person, requires the prescribing healthcare
provider to be a physician, and prohibits the use of mail pharmacies to
dispense medication abortion to the patient. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 171.006 (2021).
101. AidAccess, an international organization, stated it will continue to
send medication abortion to patients via mail, including in states that ban the
practice. See Kelly Wiley, Texas Lawmakers Tried to Halt Online Abortion Pill
Sales. Providers Say They Won’t Stop, KXAN, https://perma.cc/NB5D-URLH
(last updated Nov. 5, 2021). Because AidAccess is an international
organization, it believes it cannot be sued by anyone in these states. Id.
Further, because it takes time to ship the medication internationally,
AidAccess will now allow nonpregnant persons to order the pills in advance.
Id.; see also Olga Khazan, The Abortion Backup Plan No One is Talking About,
THE ATL., https://perma.cc/7VL2-L574 (last updated Oct. 15, 2021).
Notwithstanding these intentions, this is a legal gray area, and conservative
states are likely to try to increase enforcement of their medication abortion
laws. According to one report, around two dozen people have been prosecuted
for self-managing an abortion since 2000. Khazan, supra; see also Nicole
Fallert, Self-Managed Abortions Could be Legally Riskier After Texas’s
Six-Week Law, Advocates Say, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 16, 2021),
https://perma.cc/96ZZ-5WMQ (arguing that “people of color who already
experience disproportionate rates of criminalization” are at a higher risk of
being prosecuted for self-induced abortions). At least a few states explicitly
prohibit self-induced abortions. Nevada law, for example, provides:
A woman who takes or uses, or submits to the use of, any drug,
medicine or substance, or any instrument or other means, with the
intent to terminate her pregnancy after the 24th week of pregnancy,
unless the same is performed upon herself upon the advice of a
physician acting pursuant to the provisions of NRS 442.250, and
thereby causes the death of the child of the pregnancy, commits
manslaughter and shall be punished for a category B felony by
imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less
than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 10 years, and
may be further punished by a fine of not more than $10,000.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.220 (2013); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1-733 (2014)
(prohibiting self-induced abortion except under the supervision of a licensed
physician). A similar law in South Carolina states:
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States also restrict access to abortion by limiting insurance
coverage. This includes banning or limiting coverage provided
by (i) all private insurance plans, (ii) plans offered through
health insurance exchanges, or (iii) plans offered to public
employees.102 These restrictions, combined with those imposed
by the federal Hyde Amendment,103 may render the cost of an
abortion prohibitive, or delay necessary care while the pregnant
person raises the necessary funds.104 Problematically, delaying
abortion only increases the costs, as later-term abortions are
more expensive.105 Further, by the time a girl, woman, or person
with the capacity for pregnancy obtains sufficient funds, they
may be beyond their state’s gestational limit for an abortion.106
As a result, they must either carry the pregnancy to term or
overcome the additional time and cost required to obtain an
out-of-state abortion.107
For adolescents, parental consent or notification
requirements further restrict access to abortion.108 Most states
Except as otherwise permitted by this chapter, any woman who
solicits of any person or otherwise procures any drug, medicine,
prescription or substance and administers it to herself or who
submits to any operation or procedure or who uses or employs any
device or instrument or other means with intent to produce an
abortion, unless it is necessary to preserve her life, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by
imprisonment for a term of not more than two years or fined not
more than one thousand dollars, or both.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-80(b) (2021).
102. Regulating Insurance Coverage of Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug.
1, 2022), https://perma.cc/4YW6-KNTH. Some states have exceptions, such as
in cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest. Michele Goodwin & Mary
Ziegler, Whatever Happened to the Exceptions for Rape and Incest?, THE ATL.
(Nov. 29, 2021), https://perma.cc/B9LJ-8X3F.
103. See infra notes 119–122.
104. See Sara C.M. Roberts et al., Estimating the Proportion of
Medicaid-Eligible Pregnant Women in Louisiana Who Do Not Get Abortions
When Medicaid Does Not Cover Abortion, 19 BMC WOMEN’S HEALTH (2019); see
also Alina Salganicoff et al., The Hyde Amendment and Coverage for Abortion
Services, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 5, 2021), https://perma.cc/4EJE-QMFS.
105. Salganicoff et al., supra note 104.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST.,
(Aug. 1, 2022), https://perma.cc/J3X9-8D23.
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include a judicial bypass procedure that allows minors to obtain
court approval for an abortion without their parents’ knowledge
or consent,109 but these procedures delay care and are onerous
for an adolescent to navigate.110 Further, a judge may deny the
request.111 Instead of protecting minors, research reveals that
these requirements cause “humiliation, shame, stigma, and
sometimes trauma.”112 Prior to Dobbs, the Supreme Court
upheld parental consent and notification requirements on
numerous occasions, including in Casey.113 Now that Casey has
been overturned, adolescents’ access to abortion and their
ability to seek a judicial bypass hang in the balance.
“Conscience laws” provide states with an indirect means to
restrict abortion access.114 These laws allow certain healthcare
providers and institutions to refuse to provide abortion
services.115 As of August 2022, forty-six states allow individual
healthcare providers to refuse to provide abortion services, and
forty-four states allow certain health care institutions to refuse

109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Lauren J. Ralph, Reasons for and Logistical Burdens of
Judicial Bypass for Abortion in Illinois, 68 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 71 (2021);
“The Only People It Really Affects Are the People It Hurts”: The Human Rights
Consequences of Parental Notice of Abortion in Illinois, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Mar. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/3MVW-U34Q.
111. Justice Marshall concurred in part in Hodgson v. Minnesota to
reiterate his concerns about judicial bypass procedures, stating that a “judge’s
refusal to authorize an abortion effectively constitutes an absolute veto.”
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 473–75 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring
in part); see also Amanda Jean Stevenson et al., Denials of Judicial Bypass
Petitions for Abortion in Texas Before and After the 2016 Bypass Process
Change: 2001–2018, 110 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 351 (2020).
112. Francie Diep, Here’s What It’s Like to Argue Before a Judge That You
Should Be Able to Get an Abortion Without Telling Your Parents, PAC.
STANDARD (Sept. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/CQB5-6MVA; see also Stevenson
et al., supra note 111, at 351.
113. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899
(1992) (“Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require
a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian,
provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure.”).
114. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34703, THE HISTORY AND EFFECT OF
ABORTION CONSCIENCE CLAUSE LAWS 1 (2010).
115. See Refusing to Provide Health Services, GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug. 1,
2022), https://perma.cc/7HWB-8CQF.
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to provide abortion services.116 Essentially, these laws “provide[]
the means and legal protection to individuals and institutions
(professing sincerely held religious beliefs) to refuse to provide,
assist, or otherwise facilitate” abortion services.117
Notwithstanding Roe and Casey, this Part makes clear that
prior to Dobbs, states used many direct and indirect
mechanisms to restrict abortion, often with the Supreme Court’s
blessing. As the number and severity of restrictions mounted,
their cumulative effect often rendered abortion out of reach for
many pregnant persons.118
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs to overturn Roe and
Casey returned complete control over abortion regulations to the
states. States are now free to enact ever more stringent
restrictions, as well as outright bans, on abortion. Anti-abortion
legislatures are taking advantage of this opening, leaving the
federal government, patients, providers, and advocates
scrambling to ensure patients can access abortion—a necessary
and sometimes lifesaving medical service.
2.

Federal Laws and Regulations

Federal laws and agency regulations play an important yet
often overlooked role in the right and access to abortion,
including constraints on the right.119 The Hyde Amendment
116. Id.
117. Michele Goodwin & Allison M. Whelan, Constitutional
Exceptionalism, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1287, 1312 (2016).
118. BENJAMIN P. BROWN ET AL., ASSOCIATION OF HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE
STATE ABORTION POLICIES WITH ABORTION RATES, 2000–2014, 7 (2020),
https://perma.cc/85JC-U6CY (PDF).
119. This Article focuses on the United States, but U.S. laws and policies
also impact abortion access internationally. For example, the Mexico City
Policy (“the Policy”), often referred to as the “global gag rule,” has been
instated by every Republican President since Ronald Reagan, whereas the
Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations all rescinded the Policy. See
generally Zara Ahmed, The Unprecedented Expansion of the Global Gag Rule:
Trampling Rights, Health and Free Speech, 23 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 13
(2020), https://perma.cc/WZU7-NRBV (PDF). To receive U.S. governmental
global family planning funding under the original Policy, foreign
non-governmental organizations were required to certify that they would not
“perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning” using
funds from any source (including non-U.S. funds). White House Off. of Pol’y
Dev., U.S. Policy Statement for the International Conference on Population, 10
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represents one of the most well-known federal impediments to
abortion. First adopted in 1976, the Hyde Amendment prohibits
the use of federal funds for abortion except in cases of rape,
incest, or if the pregnancy is determined to endanger the
pregnant person’s life.120 The law dramatically limits abortion
coverage for millions who receive coverage or care through
federal programs, including Medicaid enrollees, federal
employees, military personnel and veterans, Native Americans,
and Peace Corps volunteers. The Hyde Amendment
disproportionately
impacts
populations
historically
marginalized by the healthcare system, including low-income
populations, communities of color, immigrants, young people,
and LGBTQ+ persons.121 Problematically, unintended
pregnancies are highest amongst some of these populations,
including low-income populations, individuals aged eighteen to
twenty-four, and persons of color.122
In 2021, President Biden’s budget proposal for Fiscal Year
2022 did not include the Hyde Amendment.123 This was the first
time in nearly thirty years that a President proposed a budget
without the Hyde Amendment.124 Legislators in favor of its
removal, however, reluctantly reintroduced Hyde to strike a
POP. & DEV. REV. 574, 575 (1984). The Trump Administration expanded the
Policy so that it applied to most U.S. bilateral global health assistance,
including funding for HIV under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief and other programs addressing issues such as maternal and child
health, malaria, and nutrition. The Mexico City Policy: An Explainer, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Jan 28, 2021), https://perma.cc/2FG9-S5WK. The Trump
Administration also sought to further tighten restrictions to reach other areas
of U.S. development assistance beyond global health and other non-U.S.
funding streams. Id.
120. Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418 (1976). The Supreme Court upheld
the Hyde Amendment in Harris v. McRae. See generally 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
121. See Press Release, Rosa DeLauro, U.S. Rep., U.S. House of Reps.,
Health Appropriations Subcommittee Examine Hyde Amendment’s Impact on
Women’s Rights and Economic Security (Dec. 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/E6R2RLQ8.
122. GUTTMACHER INST., UNINTENDED PREGNANCIES IN THE UNITED STATES
1 (2019), https://perma.cc/C98Q-SW2L (PDF).
123. OMB, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2022 (2022), https://perma.cc/22KL-NLR2 (PDF).
124. Susan Rinkunas, Joe Biden Stakes Out Position Against
Discriminatory Abortion Rule, THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2021),
https://perma.cc/8JS2-VLK5.

ABORTION RIGHTS AND DISABILITY EQUALITY

989

legislative deal and appease conservative lawmakers during
negotiations over the 2022 spending bill.125 In his 2023 budget
proposal, President Biden again did not include the Hyde
Amendment.126 Expectedly, Republicans threaten to push back,
articulating strong opposition to the legislation without the
Hyde Amendment.127 At the time of this writing, it remains
unclear whether President Biden’s second attempt will be
successful.
The Hyde Amendment’s ramifications are significant. That
said, focusing on the Hyde Amendment and state-level abortion
restrictions overlooks the important role of federal agency
regulations and agency-level harms to reproductive rights. The
history of the FDA’s regulation of medication abortion provides
a salient example. In 2000, the FDA approved mifepristone in a
regimen with misoprostol for the termination of intrauterine
pregnancy.128 Mifepristone is currently approved for use
through seventy days’ gestation.129
Mifepristone, however, remains subject to certain
restrictions. Currently, mifepristone is available only through a
restricted program called a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategy (REMS).130 On December 16, 2021, the FDA relaxed
some of the REMS requirements.131 Importantly, the Agency
removed the requirement that mifepristone be dispensed only in
certain healthcare settings (clinics, medical offices, and
hospitals).132 As a result, the medication can now be dispensed
125. Alexandra Martinez, Biden’s Proposed Budget Left Out the Hyde
Amendment, and Advocates Hope It Stays That Way, PRISM (Apr. 6, 2022),
https://perma.cc/FNG9-WBV5.
126. Id.
127. Aris Folley, House Negotiators Advance Final Appropriations Bill,
THE HILL (July 1, 2022), https://perma.cc/V4C2-ZD89.
128. FDA,
MIFEPREX
PRESCRIBING
INFORMATION
1,
(2019),
https://perma.cc/KAW5-9YA8 (PDF).
129. Id.
130. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1; see also Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies,
FDA. (Aug. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/S3KT-5T27.
131. Letter from Patrizia A. Cavazzoni, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation &
Res., to Graham Chelius, Soc’y of Fam. Planning, Cal. Acad. of Fam.
Physicians (Dec. 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/X4KX-EVU7 (PDF).
132. Questions & Answers on Mifeprex, FDA (Dec. 16, 2021),
https://perma.cc/RP62-F67P. This FDA action makes permanent the Biden
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through certified pharmacies and through the mail.133 This
represents a significant improvement from the prior prohibition
on the use of local and mail pharmacies and increases the
accessibility of medication abortion, particularly for persons
living in rural areas, low-income populations, persons with
disabilities, and others for whom travel is difficult.
That said, the FDA retained certain requirements,
including one that requires prescribers to be certified with the
program,134 and added a requirement that pharmacies
dispensing the drug also be certified.135 Further, the decision in
Dobbs opens the door to complete bans on medication abortion.
Thus, while the FDA’s decision to allow the use of local and mail
pharmacies represents an important step toward access, the
fight for broader and equal access to medication abortion
remains unwon, particularly at the state level.
The Title X Family Planning Program (the “Program”) is
another example of how federal agency regulation can either
restrict or promote access to reproductive healthcare. The Office
of Population Affairs (OPA) in the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) administers Title X, which provides a
broad range of services including contraception education,
wellness exams, testing for sexually transmitted infections,
breast and cervical cancer screenings, and other preventative
healthcare services.136 Title X funds cannot “be used in programs
where abortion is a method of family planning.”137 From 2000 to

Administration’s decision to exercise enforcement discretion against the
in-person dispensing requirement during the COVID-19 public health
emergency. See Letter from Janet Woodcock, Acting Cmm’r of Food & Drugs,
FDA, to Maureen G. Phipps, Chief Exec. Off., Am. Coll. or Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, & William Grobman, Pres., Soc’y for Maternal-Fetal Med. (Apr.
12, 2021), https://perma.cc/77LE-ZQRT (PDF).
133. Questions & Answers on Mifeprex, supra note 132.
134. This requirement limits the number of providers able to prescribe the
drug, and often means that a patient cannot receive a prescription from their
primary care provider. See Carrie N. Baker, FDA Lifts Some Abortion Pill
Restrictions, Leaves Others in Place: “Ignores the Science and Smacks of
Political Interference”, MS. MAG. (Dec. 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/2PG6-KL4B.
135. See Questions & Answers on Mifeprex, supra note 132.
136. OFF. POPULATION AFFS., HHS, TITLE X FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAM,
https://perma.cc/ZD5V-8PQP (PDF).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6.
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2019, agency regulations interpreted that provision narrowly
and did not prohibit referrals for abortion.138 But on March 5,
2019, HHS published a Final Rule prohibiting healthcare
providers from referring Title X patients for abortions, along
with other limitations on provider-patient communications.139
The Final Rule also required Title X clinics that provide
abortion services to physically and financially separate
non-abortion services from abortion services.140 The Final Rule
degraded the quality of services available through Title X clinics
and caused many clinics to leave the Program. The OPA’s Title
X Family Planning Annual Report for 2020 documented the
impact of the Trump Administration’s Final Rule and the
COVID-19 pandemic on the number of clients served by Title X
clinics and the number of Title X grantees and clinic sites.141 The
OPA found that from 2018 to 2020, the number of clients served
fell from 3.9 million to 1.5 million.142 The OPA estimated that
the Trump Administration’s Final Rule accounted for nearly
two-thirds of this reduction, while the COVID-19 pandemic
accounted for about one-third.143 The Program also experienced
a net decrease of more than 1,000 service sites, and all Planned
Parenthood affiliates and several state health departments
withdrew from the Program.144 Further, the Final Rule resulted
in no Title X-funded services in six states (Hawaii, Maine,
Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Washington), and substantially
reduced services in six others (Alaska, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and New York).145
Fortunately, the Biden Administration released a new
Final Rule in October 2021 to strengthen Title X.146 The Trump
Administration’s Final Rule, although no longer in effect,
138. See Comparison of 2000 and 2019 Title X Regulations, OFF.
POPULATION AFFS., HHS, https://perma.cc/LFT7-3Q9U.
139. See 84 Fed. Reg. 7714, 7760 (Mar. 4, 2019).
140. Id. at 7715.
141. See generally OFF. POPULATION AFFS., HHS, FAMILY PLANNING ANNUAL
REPORT: 2020 NATIONAL SUMMARY (Sept. 2021), https://perma.cc/7MVF-YKW7
(PDF).
142. Id. at D-5.
143. Id. at ES-5–6.
144. Id. at ES-5.
145. Id.
146. 86 Fed. Reg. 56144 (Oct. 7, 2021).
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nonetheless represents a prime example of the important role
that agency regulations play in access to abortion as well as
many other essential, non-abortion reproductive health
services. Compared to laws, regulations are typically faster and
easier to enact or change and often receive less publicity. Yet
they are extremely influential and provide a key means by
which an administration can impose its antiabortion views.
Moreover, because regulations and interpretations of
regulations often change when a new President takes office,
access to reproductive healthcare can change frequently, with
potentially devastating consequences.
II.

ABORTION ACCESS FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

The scope and severity of anti-abortion laws and
regulations frequently change with transitions in federal and
state political leadership. Recent years have been particularly
devastating for reproductive rights, with the 2022 decision in
Dobbs representing a pivotal turning point in the right and
ability to access abortion. These threats, many of which are now
reality, are even more alarming for people with intersecting
vulnerable statuses who are acutely and uniquely harmed by
anti-abortion laws.147 In other words, identity significantly
shapes the ability to exercise choice. Even while there is greater
attention paid to how race, sex, and class continue to manifest
within the reproductive rights discourse,148 far less attention is
147. Although this Part focuses on pregnant persons with physical
disabilities, many other groups are disproportionately affected by restrictive
abortion laws and policies. Others include those living in rural areas,
adolescents, the LGBTQ+ community, immigrants and noncitizens, and
victims of domestic violence and sexual assault.
148. The
disproportionate
impacts
of—and
the
connections
between—race and class have been noted and described by Supreme Court
Justices, scholars, and others. See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 578, 582 (mem.) (2021) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (noting the impact of abortion restrictions on poor women and
women of color); June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2130 (2020)
(“[T]he burdens of this increased travel would fall disproportionately on poor
women, who are least able to absorb them.”); Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 557–58 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting
in part) (suggesting that dismantling Roe would result in the deaths or injury
of “many women, especially poor and minority women”); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 343 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The class burdened by the
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given to individuals with physical disabilities. In this Part, we
unpack the important, yet often underdiscussed, intersection
between pregnancy and physical disability. In doing so, this
Article acknowledges that although the dynamics and
experiences of each group and individual are unique, the
ultimate consequences of anti-abortion laws are often
similar—they inhibit access to abortion and render choice
illusory. As discussed further in Part III, leveraging these
similarities and building bridges between the intersections,
while still providing space for individual voices, will strengthen
the fight for reproductive justice for all instead of a few.149
A disability rights perspective remained largely absent
from the fight for reproductive rights until the reproductive
justice movement took shape, which centered it as core to
achieving full reproductive equality.150 Still, much of the
discourse involving disability justice continues to focus on
persons with mental disabilities and mental illnesses,
influenced in large part by the Supreme Court’s infamous 1927
decision in Buck v. Bell.151 In Buck, which upheld a Virginia law
authorizing the sterilization of “mental defectives,” Justice
Holmes notoriously stated that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles

Hyde Amendment consists of indigent women, a substantial proportion of
whom are members of minority races.”); REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE
STORIES 1 (Melissa Murray et al. eds., 2019) (“The framework of reproductive
justice highlights the intersecting relations of race, class, sexuality, and sex
that shape the regulation of reproduction.”); Jill E. Adams & Jessica Arons, A
Travesty of Justice: Revisiting Harris v. McRae, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 5, 50–51 (2014) (“[T]he Hyde Amendment affects large numbers of women
who live at the intersection of various lines of subordination, including race,
gender, and class.”); Melissa Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice,
Racial Justice, and the Battle for Roe v. Wade, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2046,
2048, 2051 (2021).
149. See infra Part III.
150. Murray, supra note 148, at 2059. The relative absence may stem, in
part, from the problematic perception that women with disabilities are
“asexual” and not involved in romantic or intimate relationships. See Vanessa
Volz, A Matter of Choice: Women with Disabilities, Sterilization, and
Reproductive Autonomy in the Twenty-First Century, 27 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP.
203, 211 (2006).
151. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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are enough.”152 Despite wide criticism, Buck has never been
overruled.
Much work remains to advance the reproductive health and
rights of persons with mental disabilities. Indeed, a recent
report from the National Women’s Law Center found that
thirty-one states and the District of Columbia permit forced
permanent sterilization.153 Seventeen of these states allow the
permanent surgical sterilization of children with disabilities.154
A broader look at the academic and lay discourse about
abortion reveals that too often it lacks a thoughtful and
thorough discussion about the impact of abortion restrictions on
persons with physical disabilities, particularly those who also
identify with other vulnerable and politically marginalized
groups. Historically in the United States, the political and
cultural norms have been to diminish the autonomy of and take
bodily control away from people of color and vulnerable
groups,155 and persons with physical disabilities are no
exception. In this urgent moment of attention to historic
patterns of racial discrimination that emanate from the vestiges
of slavery and Jim Crow, retrenchment of systemic sex
discrimination, and clear work yet unfinished with regard to
LGBTQ+ discrimination, we argue that individuals with
disabilities must be centered in pathways forward, particularly
as discrimination may be compounded in their lives.
In the context of reproduction, and abortion particularly,
discussions about physical disability often focus on birth defects.
Indeed, physical disability, much like race and mental
disability, is “intertwined in the history of eugenics [and] linked
in contemporary discourses about abortion rights,” such as those
about disability-based abortion bans, which prohibit abortions

152.
153.

Id. at 205, 207.
NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., FORCED STERILIZATION OF DISABLED PEOPLE
IN THE UNITED STATES 18–19 (2021), https://perma.cc/8U4W-AYF6 (PDF). As
noted in the report, these laws affect primarily persons with developmental
and intellectual disabilities, as well as people with disabilities related to
mental health. Id. at 31.
154. Id. at 34.
155. See, e.g., Bell, 274 U.S. 200; Mhatre, supra note 10, at 4–5.
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based on the diagnosis of a fetal disability or impairment.156 This
problematic history creates tensions that abortion opponents
frequently and unfairly exploit. Claiming to care about
antidiscrimination, they hone in on disability-based abortion
bans to “win over ambivalent voters and legislators who are
concerned about disability discrimination” and to “dampen the
enthusiasm of those angry about abortion restrictions.”157
Abortion opponents claim that abortions based on fetal
disability are “the height of prejudice,”158 whereas abortion
rights advocates generally emphasize how abortion can prevent
newborn suffering and provide options to pregnant persons
faced with devastating fetal diagnoses.159
Similar to discussions about race, these narratives exploit
divisions between advocates for reproductive rights and
disability rights, inhibiting successful collective advocacy.160
And yet, abortion opponents’ expressed concerns about equality
and antidiscrimination fall flat, as they tend to simultaneously
and hypocritically turn a blind eye to the discriminatory effects
of other anti-abortion laws they promote, which harm the very
people they claim to serve.161 Opponents of abortion focus on
hypothetical disabled fetuses at the expense of those who
156. Murray, supra note 148, at 2060. “Disability-based bans” are also
encompassed in terms like “reason bans” and “trait-selection bans,” which
include banning abortion for reasons such as sex or race selection. See
generally id. (trait-selection laws/bans); Mary Ziegler, The Disability Politics
of Abortion, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 587 (2017) (disability-based bans) [hereinafter
Ziegler, Disability Politics]; Mhatre, supra note 10 (reason bans); see also
Kendall Ciesemier, Opinion, Leave My Disability Out of Your Anti-Abortion
Propaganda, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2022), https://perma.cc/Z6WU-ZAEF.
157. Ziegler, Disability Politics, supra note 156, at 621.
158. National Right to Life (@nrlc), TWITTER (Sept. 27, 2019, 3:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/L2Y5-TEUZ.
159. See Personal Stories: How Bans on Abortion Later in Pregnancy Hurt
People, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://perma.cc/3B6T-HW8R; see also Murray,
supra note 148, at 2060–62. See generally Ziegler, Disability Politics, supra
note 156.
160. For an account of the role of race in the abortion debate, see Murray,
supra note 148, at 2031–62.
161. See Mhatre, supra note 10, at 11; see also Ziegler, Disability Politics,
supra note 156; Ciesemier, supra note 156 (“Despite the fact that abortion
opponents would champion my disabled ‘life’ in my mom’s womb, the laws
they’ve levied across the country now put my life and that of other disabled
and chronically ill people in danger . . . .”).
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actually bear the brunt of anti-abortion laws: pregnant persons
with disabilities, who become a mere afterthought, collateral
damage in the war against reproductive justice.
The complicated history between reproductive rights and
disability rights must be acknowledged and confronted, but it
does not warrant stripping pregnant persons of the right to
control their bodies.162 Indeed, eugenics and anti-abortion
policies produce similar consequences: they diminish the
dignity, autonomy, and worth of marginalized populations. To
elevate the voices of pregnant persons with disabilities, it is
critical to examine abortion restrictions with a sharper eye
toward the harms imposed on pregnant persons with physical
disabilities.
Laws that require medically unnecessary clinic trips,
prohibit the use of telemedicine, or prohibit the use of local retail
or mail pharmacies to obtain medication abortion create
significant and sometimes insurmountable barriers for persons
with disabilities for whom travel may be physically or
logistically difficult. Our society remains woefully far from
achieving equal accessibility, despite laws prohibiting
discrimination against persons with disabilities.163 Persons with
disabilities may be reliant on others for transportation, such as
162. See Ciesemier, supra note 156 (“What chronically ill and disabled
people need is autonomy to make the health care choices right for them. It’s
what we all deserve.”).
163. The experience of Senator Tammy Duckworth during the January 6,
2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol illuminates our country’s failures to make
society accessible. Senator Duckworth, an Iraq War veteran who uses a
wheelchair due to a battle injury, barricaded herself in her office instead of
sheltering with the other Senators because she feared the Senate’s
inaccessibility would hinder her escape if the Senators needed to move.
Warren Rojas & Kayla Epstein, Sen. Tammy Duckworth Sheltered on Her Own
on January 6 Because Evacuating the Senate Would Have Been Nearly
Impossible for a Wheelchair User, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 27, 2021),
https://perma.cc/445Z-26D7. In another tragic example, Engracia Figueroa, a
disability rights activist, died due to complications from injuries sustained
after United Airlines broke her custom wheelchair. Blithe Riley, Hand in
Hand Grieves the Loss of Engracia Figueroa, HAND IN HAND (Nov. 3, 2021),
https://perma.cc/QH5B-LFAC. While battling with United to get a
replacement, she had to use a loaner chair that caused pressure sores and
other health problems. Id. A pressure sore became infected, and the infection
reached her hip bone, requiring emergency services. Id. Figueroa passed away
on October 31, 2021. Id.
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public transport, paratransit, family, or friends. Finding an
accessible clinic and coordinating transportation to that clinic
can take time. By the time a pregnant person with a disability
can do so, they may fall outside their state’s gestational limit for
abortion, requiring additional time and out-of-state travel to
obtain an abortion, if they can at all. Further, depending on the
location of the nearest accessible abortion facility, public
transportation may be unavailable and paying for a cab or ride
share may be cost-prohibitive or not disability-friendly. And
importantly, the abortion decision is incredibly personal and
private. Structuring or restricting abortion access in a way that
requires a pregnant person to rely on others for unnecessary and
potentially lengthy travel is thus problematic. In fact, for
victims of intimate partner violence, this could be dangerous or
even fatal.164
Most persons with disabilities can safely carry pregnancies
to term, but some may face a higher risk of complications,
rendering pregnancy dangerous or even life-threatening.165 In
fact, pregnancy represents a dangerous time for disabled and
nondisabled persons alike in the United States, which has the
highest maternal mortality rate among developed countries.166
This issue is all the more tragic and urgent for persons with
disabilities and Black women who, regardless of disability
status, are more likely to suffer or die from pregnancy-related

164. See Lysaundra Campbell, The Hidden Link Between Domestic
Violence and Abortion, REWIRE NEWS GRP. (Oct. 19, 2019),
https://perma.cc/33B9-WG25 (“Financially burdensome and medically
unnecessary requirements—like making multiple trips or traveling long
distances—makes obtaining abortion care difficult for those whose daily tasks,
bank accounts, and access to friends and family may be controlled by an
abusive partner.”); see also infra notes 174–176 and accompanying text.
165. See JESSICA L. GLEASON ET AL., RISK OF ADVERSE OUTCOMES IN
PREGNANT WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES 1 (2021), https://perma.cc/8X2F-NNFV;
Vill. Univ. Coll. of Nursing, Pregnancy in Women with Disabilities, NAT’L
LEAGUE FOR NURSING (2017), https://perma.cc/GL4X-T4ZV; Meena
Venkataramanan, Their Medications Cause Pregnancy Issues. Post-Roe, That
Could be Dangerous, WASH. POST (July 25, 2022), https://perma.cc/MR8PC979.
166. See Roni Caryn Rabin, Maternal Deaths Rose During the First Year of
the Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2022), https://perma.cc/34GF-2F8X.
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complications.167 These risks make timely access to reproductive
healthcare, including abortion, an important part of mitigating
risks for these groups. Yet, the states most hostile to
reproductive rights have some of the highest rates of maternal
morbidity and mortality.168
Further, restrictions that increase the financial cost of
abortion are particularly problematic for persons with
disabilities, who have a higher risk of economic insecurity due
in large part to systemic discrimination, exclusion from the
workforce, expensive healthcare, and a broken—if not
altogether absent—social safety net.169 In 2019, for example,
only one in four persons with disabilities ages sixteen and over
were employed.170 People of color with disabilities fare worse
and are more likely to be unemployed and live in poverty than
white people with disabilities.171 The COVID-19 pandemic
167. See Mhatre, supra note 10, at 6; GLEASON ET AL., supra note 165, at 1.
The most recently available U.S. maternal mortality rate for 2020 was 23.8
maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, higher than the 2019 rate of 20.1.
DONNA L. HOYERT, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., MATERNAL MORTALITY RATES
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2020, 3 (2022), https://perma.cc/LL2J-W2YF (PDF).
This translated to 861 maternal deaths in 2020. Id. The maternal mortality
rate for non-Hispanic Black women (55.3) was 2.9 times the rate for
non-Hispanic white women (19.1) and 3 times the rate for Hispanic women
(18.2). Id. at 1.
168. See SURGO VENTURES, GETTING HYPERLOCAL TO IMPROVE OUTCOMES &
ACHIEVE RACIAL EQUITY IN MATERNAL HEALTH: THE US MATERNAL
VULNERABILITY INDEX 11 (Aug. 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/S6MJ-U5UH (PDF);
Sema Sgaier & Jordan Downey, Opinion, What We See in the Shameful Trends
in U.S. Maternal Health, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/8J3KXSBR.
169. See Mhatre, supra note 10, at 7. Abortion restrictions can increase the
costs of abortion in many ways. Id. Requiring unnecessary clinic visits means
additional, potentially unpaid, time off from work and increases the costs of
transportation and childcare. Id. Further, abortion-related insurance
restrictions increase the cost of the procedure itself. Id.
170. Selected
Economic
Characteristics
for
the
Civilian
Noninstitutionalized Population by Disability Status, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://perma.cc/5PTS-RLKL.
171. See Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional Population
by Disability Status and Selected Characteristics, 2020 Annual Averages, U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Feb. 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/Y6LB-PLP3;
NANETTE GOODMAN ET AL., NAT’L DISABILITY INST., FINANCIAL INEQUALITY:
DISABILITY, RACE, AND POVERTY IN AMERICA 12 (2019), https://perma.cc/J36SNL85 (PDF).
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exacerbated these disparities, as people with disabilities were
more likely to become unemployed during the pandemic.172
Further, because people with disabilities, especially those of
color, often rely on Medicaid, they are more likely to encounter
a lack of insurance coverage for abortion due to the Hyde
Amendment and other laws and policies restricting use of public
funds for abortions.173 As a result, they may have to pay for an
abortion out of pocket, potentially forgoing other life necessities
such as medication or food.
Finally, persons with disabilities are more likely to be
victims of intimate partner violence and violent crimes like rape
and sexual assault.174 Persons with disabilities make up
approximately 12% of the population, but 26.5% of rape/sexual
assault victims.175 When sexual assault results in pregnancy,
the victim may need access to abortion. Laws that eliminate
exceptions for rape and incest are thus particularly troubling
and inhumane. These laws amplify the harms of sexual assault,
reviolating the victim’s bodily autonomy and exposing them to
further indignity and trauma. Timely and confidential access to
abortion and other healthcare services are imperative for
victims of sexual assault or interpersonal violence. Moreover,
because persons with disabilities may have to rely on others for
transportation, it may be extremely difficult to access abortion
without their abuser’s knowledge. Restrictions that require

172. Press Release, Kessler Found., nTIDE May 2020 Special Report:
Workers with Disabilities in the COVID Economy (May 20, 2020),
https://perma.cc/Y9EB-3C8A.
173. See supra notes 102–105, 120–122 and accompanying text; see also
Mhatre, supra note 10, at 9–10.
174. See ERIKA HARRELL, DOJ, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIME AGAINST
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (Nov. 2021), https://perma.cc/B329-KDGL (PDF)
(“In 2019, the rate of violent victimization against persons with disabilities
was nearly four times the rate for persons without disabilities.”); Sexual
Violence and Intimate Partner Violence Among People with Disabilities, CDC,
https://perma.cc/YCL2-4GNA; see also, e.g., Kendall Ciesemier, Opinion,
Misusing Words Like ‘Groomer’ Isn’t Just Wrong. It’s Dangerous., N.Y. TIMES
(May 31, 2022), https://perma.cc/WC9C-LPDN (“In my case, a medical
professional used my reliance on health care, as a child with a life-threatening
illness, to take advantage of me, stripping away any remnant of bodily
autonomy I had left.”).
175. HARRELL, supra note 174, at 4.
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multiple, medically unnecessary, trips to a healthcare facility
exacerbate these risks.176
Persons with disabilities, particularly those living at the
intersections of other identities such as persons of color with
disabilities or transgender persons with disabilities, undeniably
experience the harms of abortion restrictions in uniquely
burdensome ways. The disproportionate harms experienced by
pregnancy-capable people with disabilities discussed in this
Part expose the devasting consequences of the ongoing and
strengthening attack on abortion rights in the United States. At
the same time, it illuminates commonalities between the
experiences of people with multiple vulnerable statuses that can
be used to forge strong alliances in the fight for reproductive
justice. The need for action is clear, and the time is now to forge
intersectional coalitions.
III. REIMAGINED ADVOCACY: INTERSECTIONAL COALITION
BUILDING TO ADVANCE ABORTION RIGHTS AND AMPLIFY
DISABILITY JUSTICE
In an enlightening essay published in the New York Times,
Kendall Ciesemier offers a poignant first-person account of
living with a disability and being pro-choice.177 She explains,
“[t]wo liver transplants and countless other lifesaving
interventions later,” as a twenty-nine-year-old woman, “it’s
clear that I will not have the same freedom to make choices
about my own body that my mother had.”178 She argues,
“[a]bortion opponents like to use disabled fetuses as pawns to
support their politics” and she acknowledges that even
sometimes she is moved by those arguments, because the
human value of “disabled people is often overlooked or
ignored.”179 That said, she concludes, “I know this inner conflict
is manufactured and sold to me, not of me.”180
176. Domestic violence concerns were emphasized by the Supreme Court
in striking down a spousal notification requirement in Casey. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98 (1992).
177. Ciesemier, supra note 156.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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In reality, abortion restrictions wreak havoc on the lives of
all those needing abortion care, with acute consequences for
pregnant persons living at the intersections of historically
marginalized and vulnerable identities. According to Ciesemer,
abortion opponents too frequently forget that “pregnancy can
endanger disabled people,” and “[r]emoving abortion access is
not protecting our lives; it is putting them in danger.”181
Indeed, the voices of girls, women, and pregnancy-capable
persons with disabilities too often remain unheard, muted, or
fragmented in the discourse. More troublingly, abortion
opponents may appropriate their voices and use them in
selective, misleading, and divisive ways that fail to appreciate
the complicated and nuanced history of reproductive
regulation.182 This strategy drives divisions between those
otherwise united by a common goal: the realization of human
rights that advance bodily autonomy, self-determination,
equality, and inclusion.183
Why is this so? If restrictive abortion laws and regulations
harm the interests of all persons capable of becoming pregnant,
if all historically marginalized persons experience uniquely
burdensome harms, and if all are united by the common goal of
reproductive justice, what inhibits broad and effective coalition
building?
Part of the answer lies in a failure to appreciate that
reproductive justice and reproductive choice mean different
things for different people and groups. Indeed, there is a long
history of social movements sidelining or silencing the concerns
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 157–161 and accompanying text.
183. Claims of racial, disability, socioeconomic, and LGBTQ+
discrimination and injustice have informed efforts to both expand and restrict
abortion rights. See, e.g., J.C. WILKE, ABORTION AND SLAVERY: HISTORY REPEATS
(1984); Murray, supra note 148, at 2062–72; Mary Ziegler, Bad Effects: The
Misuses of History in Box v. Planned Parenthood, 105 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE
165, 165–66 (2020); Ziegler, Disability Politics, supra note 156, 588–90;
Gregory Angelo, If You’re Gay, You Should Choose Life, WASH. EXAM’R (Jan.
17, 2019), https://perma.cc/WV2Z-YL7D (“If being gay is not a choice, gay
people should be mindful of the likelihood that if it ever becomes possible for
prenatal testing to identify whether a child is heterosexual or homosexual, the
incentive to abort gay babies will become a reality.”); Valerie Ploumpis,
Abortion Rights are LGBTQ Rights, THE HILL (June 14, 2019),
https://perma.cc/3UNH-FXZG.
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of politically marginalized groups in order to advance the
movement’s broader goals, such as movements that have largely
centered on the political advancement and civil liberties
concerns of white women.184 For example, scholars’ rigorous
critiques of “white feminism” for essentializing and
universalizing white women’s experience as if it represents all
women’s experience persuasively demonstrate how this brand of
feminism over time has ignored race, class, sexual identity, and
other experiences to the neglect and detriment of all women.185
For example, Margaret Sanger, who founded the American
Birth Control League, which later became the Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, linked the birth control
movement to eugenics to appeal to wealthy white men and
women—a wider audience than the poor women she
served—and to “emphasize contraception not only as conducive
to women’s health and autonomy, but also as a means of
promoting the national welfare.”186
Rather than advocating for change separately in a
piecemeal fashion, or worse, in a manner that sows division
among groups of women and other stakeholders, we urge a social
184. The women’s suffrage movement provides one salient example. See,
e.g., Joan Marie Johnson, “Not as a Favor, Not as a Privilege, But as a Right”:
Woman Suffragists, Race, Rights, and the Nineteenth Amendment, 42 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 385, 394–96 (2020) (noting that anti-Black racism infected the
women’s suffrage movement); Margaret E. Johnson, Lessons Learned from the
Suffrage Movement, 2 MD. BAR J. 115, 117 (2020) (“Specifically, at times the
suffrage movement leaders prioritized white women’s voting rights over
non-white women’s voting rights in order to appease racist chapters within
their own organizations.”); Tracy Thomas, Reclaiming the Long History of the
“Irrelevant” Nineteenth Amendment, 105 MINN. L. REV. 2623, 2645–46 (2021)
(describing how after Reconstruction, the women’s suffrage movement
“affirmatively engaged in racist politics”).
185. See CHELA SANDOVAL, METHODOLOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 45–52
(Sandra Buckley et al. eds., 2000) (describing the work of feminists of color
that identified how white feminists dismissed concerns and experiences of
women of color, creating a “single-issue” feminism that falsely universalized
white women’s experience as all women’s experience). See generally Angela P.
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990).
186. Murray, supra note 148, at 2039; see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING
THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 65–112
(discussing how the reproductive rights movement was marked by racism and
eugenics); Dorothy Roberts & Sujatha Jesudason, Movement Intersectionality:
The Case of Race, Gender, Disability, and Genetic Technologies, 10 DU BOIS
REV. 321, 321 (2013).
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movement-oriented reframing of the reproductive health, rights,
and justice movement and agenda. First, as an initial matter,
we recognize that law has its limits and courts, while important
to protecting the rule of law, too frequently fail. Second, a
movement to merely restore Roe-level protections ultimately
disserves people at the margins, including those who experience
socioeconomic constraints, people living in rural areas, and
individuals with mobility disabilities. Such vulnerabilities hold
at bay the right to terminate a pregnancy. Simply restoring Roe
would also fail to account for the myriad ways in which racial
injustice, LGBTQ+ discrimination, and hardships targeted at
individuals with disabilities too frequently compound
marginalization and vulnerability.
In other words, we posit that the new social movement
agenda should engage intersectional coalition-building. As such,
all communities affected by reproductive injustice can find
solidarity and work together to build coalitions that incorporate
and accept different identities and needs while still pursuing
common
goals.
Importantly,
effective
intersectional
coalition-building demands that individual experiences not get
lost. Rather, it requires the amplification of voices that on their
own lack a platform and go unheard. At its core, intersectional
coalition-building is about utilizing commonalities to support
collective action while understanding and making space for the
unique experiences of individuals with different identities.
There exists no universal “woman” or “pregnant person”
experience, and coalitions seeking to advance abortion rights
must avoid both essentialism and sacrificing one group’s
interests to further the interests of another. Coalitions must
also recognize that some groups in the coalition experience
different or greater harms than others.187
Protecting reproductive freedom is a concern that anchors
across race, sex, LGBTQ+ identity, and disability status. Yet,
historic patterns of oppression, as well as divestment or
exclusion from the political process, have traditionally sidelined
the interests of groups with marginalized status.188

187. It is undeniable, for example, that a low-income, Black, transgender
man with a disability will experience more obstacles in accessing an abortion
than a white, financially stable, nondisabled lesbian.
188. See supra Part II.
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However, intersectional advocacy in social movements
might hold promise for advancing reproductive health, rights,
and justice. Simply put, where separate voices are muted and
silenced, collective intersectional advocacy can offer an effective
means of articulating overlapping group concerns. Such
movements also have the potential to reshape political agendas
and influence elections, simply by the scale of numbers. More
individuals within a coalition may produce a greater number of
voters to support the cause of a candidate committed to
reproductive justice. An intersectional approach to
coalition-building provides the basis for reconceptualizing the
fight for abortion rights as a movement for all persons capable
of becoming pregnant.
The recognition of common experiences—from the
entrenched and ongoing history of discrimination and abuse to
the current disproportionate harms imposed by abortion
restrictions—provides a fundamental starting point for building
bridges between the intersections. For example, Part II makes
clear that women and pregnancy-capable people with physical
disabilities are more likely to live in poverty and rely on
Medicaid, and therefore face economic constraints and
insurance coverage restrictions for abortions.189 Thus, all will
benefit from the elimination of state and federal restrictions on
the use of government funds for abortions. Similarly, removing
requirements that result in medically unnecessary trips to
healthcare facilities and allowing broader use of telemedicine,
local retail pharmacies, and mail pharmacies for medication
abortion will significantly improve access to early abortion care
for Americans with disabilities who frequently experience
unique hurdles caused by travel and financial constraints, as
well as privacy and safety concerns. That said, not all
individuals experience the same type or magnitude of harm.
Thus, although ultimate goals may remain common, achieving
those goals may require different approaches for different
identities. This fact reinforces the importance of ensuring that
the voices of each individual and each group remain heard.
Effective and inclusive coalitions require trade-offs, as members
must be willing to advance or even prioritize outcomes that have
little to no direct or immediate impact on their lives.
189.

See supra Part II.
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CONCLUSION
There is a fraught irony revealed by reproductive freedom
advocates who live with disabilities. The Supreme Court’s
decision in Dobbs denies them the constitutional and
reproductive liberty that their mothers had two generations ago.
For them, and all persons affected by Dobbs, the fight for
reproductive health, rights, and justice remains long and
unwon. Ongoing and devastating attacks on abortion rights and
access at the state and federal levels prove its fragility and the
need for continual, ever-stronger advocacy. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Dobbs is not the end. On the contrary, it is
just the beginning, requiring new and innovative approaches to
reproductive justice advocacy. While the constitutional right to
abortion has been eviscerated, leading many states to ban or
further restrict access to abortion, abortion remains legal in
some states and thus theoretically accessible. But as exposed by
this Article, it is realistically accessible only to women and
pregnancy-capable persons with the resources, support, and
ability to travel. Post-Roe, women and pregnancy-capable
persons with physical disabilities face even greater and
increasingly insurmountable barriers to affordable and
accessible abortion care.
Intersectional coalition-building that brings together a
multi-dimensional group of individuals with different
experiences—yet common goals—provides an important weapon
in the fight to advance reproductive freedom, bodily autonomy,
self-determination, equality, and inclusion. This Article exposes
that although coalition-based, interdependent, and interwoven
advocacy is not without challenges, with work and dedication
those challenges can be overcome to build a stronger movement
that ensures all voices are heard and that the rights of all are
secured. Reproductive justice will not be attained until it is
attained for all.

